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Institutional Analysis Model for Examining Direct 
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Budgeting
Abstract: Direct democracy, the tradition of which dates back to ancient Athens, is now widely 
practised in many countries around the world. In this paper, a case study of participatory budgeting 
is given as an illustration of how residents can decide directly about their common resources. The 
paper is theoretical in nature. It aims to present a model of institutional analysis of direct democra‑
cy phenomena based on the example of participatory budgets analysis, taking into account varia‑
bles related to two novel approaches: Varieties of Capitalism and intersectionality. This model can 
be used for diagnosing aspects of local democracy, comparative studies of participatory budgeting 
processes taking place in various countries around the world, as well as for further research into oth‑
er processes of direct democracy, thus contributing to the development of knowledge in this field 
and to social sciences in general.
Keywords: direct democracy, participatory budget, new institutional economics, varieties of capi‑
talism, intersectionality approach
JEL: B52, H3, H72, P48
82 Zofia Łapniewska
FOE 2(341) 2019 www.czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/foe/
1. Introduction
The term “democracy” is very potent and as such can be used as a political weap‑
on, considering variations in its meaning due to its perception through the prism 
of universal connotations (Saward, 2008: 28–30). Dictionary definitions assume 
that it means the exercise of power by the nation, citizens, and this is exactly 
what it etymologically means: the rule of the domos, that is, the people (Wat‑
son, Barber, 1990: 9; Oxford English Dictionary, 2018), where people can make 
decisions for themselves, directly or indirectly (through elected officials). Paul 
Nursey‑Bray adds that democracy is based on discussion – as opposed to rul‑
ing by force – a discussion that takes place between people treated equally, 
or their representatives, not just between representatives of a hereditary clique 
(Nursey‑Bray, 1983: 101). The emphasis in defining democracy is usually placed 
on two different categories: principles, i.e. an indication that citizens have power 
and can make decisions, and democratic mechanisms, i.e. procedures and discus‑
sion as forms guaranteeing effective exercise of universal power (Saward, 2008: 
33–34).The greatest controversy related to this issue is how to determine “who the 
so‑called people are”. Does this category consist of citizens only (Hickey, Mo‑




belong) gathered in the ancient agora and took part in the vote, usually by rais‑
ing their hands. At the time, only 40,000 out of 120,000 inhabitants of Athens 
had voting rights. Today, although slavery has been abolished and women have 
the right to vote all over the world – Brunei being the only exception (Tovrov, 
2011) –living in a given country does not always entitle one to make decisions 
about it (see the debate on citizenship in post‑war Europe related to welfare state 
(Turner, 1986; Barbalet, 1988), or current, often racist and xenophobic, attacks 
on migrants and refugees). Citizenship is not only a privilege, but also an obliga‑
tion, encompassing, among others, the permission to be monitored and recorded 
by the state apparatus (to which the EU GDPR does not apply – Czubkowska, 
Ivanova, 2018) as well as being dependent on, for example, international rela‑
tions (free movement of people), complying to all institutional bans and orders 
placed between the poles of freedom and security.
Today, in many countries, including those highly developed ones, social 
groups complain about a democratic deficit and deterioration of trust in govern‑
ments, both of which were classified by Jack Hayward (1995) as elements of the 
“crisis of representation”. The crisis of representation manifests itself through 
an incapacity of the political system to satisfy expectations of citizens and to pre‑
serve public confidence that their interests are represented (Hayward, 1995: 1–3). 
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Instead, corruption, clientelism and losing touch with their electorate undermine 
the credibility of representatives/politicians and voters start to insist that they 
be allowed to govern directly – as it is in the case of participatory budgeting, 
an instance of direct democracy described later in this article (Gay, 2001; Gór‑
ski, 2007). Direct democracy processes are also introduced in response to appeals 
to the democratic values of openness and inclusiveness (Rossmann, Shanahan, 
2012), advocating the position that the process itself is as important as its ends 
(Cook, 1996). Direct democracy is perceived as one of the oldest innovations 
in democratic thought (Saward, 2008: 148). The literature on the subject indi‑
cates that it most often takes the form of a referendum and as such does not have 
to weaken representative governments, but is instead a complementary concept 
(Toplak, 2013). There are multiple questions that need to be addressed with regard 
to direct democracy: are all groups properly represented? Will minority groups 
be protected from being dominated by a populist or intolerant majority? Can only 
persons who have civil rights participate in direct governance? What should the 
public debate look like? We live in a time when access to information is facilitat‑
ed by the Internet (although the level of information noise has also significantly 
increased) and citizens’ rights are guaranteed and cannot be undermined by any 
referendum. The question of deliberation remains. In recent decades, direct de‑
mocracy has been a new dominant trend current in democratic thought, with 
particular emphasis placed on engaging all citizens in the discussion as equals 
(Bohman, 1998: 401). The discussion is aimed at going beyond the mechanism 
of registering preferences and counting votes in the elections, focussing instead 
on the process, i.e. goals of the debate (such as understanding, reaching a con‑
sensus, arriving at an agreement), individual goals (confidence building, clarifi‑
cation of issues and points of view), building standards of debate (institutions1), 
inclusion of all actors and parties in the process, and establishing the agora (e.g. 
a civic forum, local community, social movement, within or outside state borders) 
(Saward, 2008: 144–148).
Within the above‑mentioned theoretical framework of direct democracy, 
which for me, indispensably, is also a deliberative one, I will consider the exam‑
ple of participatory budgeting as an illustration of this form of democracy. The aim 
of this article is to present a model of institutional analysis for direct democracy 
phenomena, exemplified by the premises of participatory budgets analysis, taking 
into account variables related to different Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), affecting 
decision‑making processes and membership, and the diversity of these members 
in intersectional terms (both VoC and intersectionality are defined in the next part 
of this paper). As a result of literature research, I designed a model that, along with 
1 Institutions understood as norms, conventions, formally sanctioned rules and common strat‑
egies (Ostrom, 2005; Vatn, 2005: 83).
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and agency? The model is designed to systematise and explain processes and in‑
stitutions of direct democracy phenomena as well as gather information about 
changes taking place in such a way that the resulting knowledge will empower the 
people and engender higher efficiency of governance.
2. Varieties of Capitalism and Intersectional Approach
Varieties of Capitalism signify different models and forms of organisation of cap‑
italist system regimes, adapted to local conditions and institutional environment 
(Berger, Dore, 1996; Stark, 1996; Crouch, Streeck, 1997; Hall, Soskice, 2001; Peck, 
Theodore, 2007). VoCs have a socially and culturally embedded nature of econom‑
ic relations and structures and various degrees of (dis)connection with neoclassical 
economics (Peck, Theodore, 2007: 732–733). They also have, in our case, an in‑
fluence on the way participatory budgeting (PB) is organised. Peter A. Hall and 
David Soskice (2001) distinguish two major types of capitalism: a “liberal market 
economy” (e.g. the USA or UK) – a model that lacks coordinating capacity, char‑
acterised by “absence of long‑term stable cross‑shareholding arrangements” and 
by an “inability to act collectively”; and a “coordinated market economy” (like 
the ones in Germany or Sweden) – identified by long‑term strategies of employers, 
where their structural relationships are framed by regulatory networks (Soskice, 
1999: 110–111). Poland, as well as other Central‑East European states described 
later by Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthart (2009), is perceived as a depend‑
ent market economy that relies on foreign capital, e.g.: foreign direct investments. 
It is a country to which transnational companies are attracted by competitive wag‑
es and sufficient knowledge of technology and can force their preferences in ab‑
sence of institutions resulting from the collapse of command economy (Jasiecki, 
2013; Dudziak, 2014: 73–74).
In my model, I assume that residents’ motivations, the way they operate and 
make economic decisions, are influenced by the cultural and socio‑economic con‑
text which also shapes the variant of capitalism present in the country. Accord‑
ing to the theory of Varieties of Capitalism, the ways and forms of organisation 
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tudes and decisions of participatory budgeting. This model is oriented toward the 
analysis of this impact in relation to the analytical framework of the new institu‑
tional economics (NIE).
The use of such a perspective in this paper stems from the fact that, unlike the 
standard neoclassical assumptions, it rejects beliefs such as that individuals have 
access to perfect information, so that their actions are driven by unbounded ration‑
ality, and that transactions are costless and rapid (Ménard, Shirley, 2008). At the 
same time, however, NIE does not abandon the orthodox assumptions of scarcity 
and competition – it is “not […] giving new answers to the traditional questions 
of economics – resource allocation and the degree of utilization. Rather it consists 




tional arrangements. Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and 
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environ‑
ment” (Ménard, Shirley, 2008: 1). Institutions are, therefore, created to reduce risk 
as well as transaction costs (e.g. to acquire information) and take either a written 
form – in the case of formal institutions such as laws, contracts and regulations 





ture empirical participatory budgeting research. My model is taking into account 




The second innovative concept used in my model is the intersectional approach 
(Hankivsky et al., 2012). The intersectionality framework is a new and complex 
approach generating knowledge necessary for achieving more just, inclusive and 
efficient policies (Hankivsky et al., 2012: 7). It goes beyond earlier methodologies 
that focused on social determinants such as gender, race or socio‑economic status, 
encouraging researchers to reflect on multifaceted relationships and interactions 
between social locations (forces, factors and power structures) and identities (e.g. 
gender expression, sexuality, age, indigeneity, immigration status, religion and 
ability) that shape and influence human life. These social locations, as well as ac‑
cess to power and resources, are constructed socially by policies that target cer‑
tain groups, and therefore might exclude others. Still, there is a growing expecta‑
tion from governments to deliver policies advancing social justice and correcting 
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power imbalances, by addressing, among others, damaging stereotypes (Marmot, 
2012). There is also a growing civic interest in analysis and monitoring of govern‑
mental policies, as mentioned in the introduction to this paper, and with it comes 
pressure to improve the measurement of their effects by showing their impact 









of social experience (Hankivsky et al., 2012: 16). These policies interact with lo‑
cal values, norms and practices (that are subjects central to the analysis of insti‑
tutional economics), and therefore have a different impact on people, giving them 
privileges or penalising them. To address these shortcomings – in the case of this 
paper in reference to participatory budgets in different countries – the paradigm 
of intersectionality, aimed at understanding, analysing and responding to multiple 
inequalities, will be adopted. Specific variables, characteristics of actors’ identi‑
ties, which can be translated into power relations, are presented in the fourth part 
of this article.
3. Participatory budgets
Both theoretically and practically, participatory budgeting is recognised as a part 
of the field of democratic innovations (Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke, 2008). Around 




mentioned above and – most importantly – allows citizens to apply their ideas 
on changing or refining their nearest surroundings. These could be investments 
in physical as well as in social infrastructure (Frischmann, 2012; Himmelweit, 
2016) that improve their well‑being (by e.g. investment in training, studies or care 
services). Although the phenomenon of participation in fiscal decisions by citizens, 
as mentioned in the introduction to this article, goes back to ancient Athens (Hansen, 
1987; Manville, Ober, 2003), the popularisation of participatory budgets in the last 
two decades in Europe was mainly due to numerous studies of two cases: Brazil‑
ian Porto Alegre and Christchurch from New Zealand (Ruesch, Wagner, 2012).
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expectancy, higher literacy rate and lower infant mortality are just a few of many 
considerable improvements of inhabitants’ well‑being reported by the World Bank 
after ten years of exercising participatory budgeting in the city (Marquetti, Schon‑
erwald da Silvia, Campbell, 2009). It should also be mentioned that Porto Alegre, 
a port city, the capital of the Rio Grande do Sul region, remains one of the richest 
cities in the country. It is an important industrial centre of Brazil with several uni‑
versities, but at the same time a significant part of the population (25–30 per cent) 
lives in favelas (Górski, 2007: 66). Many people claim that this unique character 




Alegre, the investment plan and the accompanying budget were discussed in three 
dimensions and three stages. The dimensions included: neighbourhood assemblies 
(geographical base), a comprehensive vision for the future of the city (thematic 
base) and, finally, the city administration (technical and programme database). All 
residents over 16 were able to participate and submit their ideas at neighbourhood 
and thematic meetings (stage 1). 16 districts, as well as 5 thematic assemblies, se‑
lected their representatives to be sent as delegates to the district and thematic fo‑
rums, which held debates, negotiations and voting (stage 2). After the delegates 
returned to their districts and thematic areas, in the second round of debates open 
to all, councillors were elected to the participatory budget council. Finally, they 
were responsible for approving the plans for infrastructural investments and, con‑
sequently, the financial resources allocated to them (stage 3) (Górski, 2007: 73).
The city of Christchurch from New Zealand adopted a different form of par‑
ticipation. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, it implemented a reform called 
“participation for modernisation” (Sintomer, Herzberg, Röcke, 2008), placing par‑
ticular emphasis on social consultations and the assessment of the proposed budget 
by the residents (the budget plan is presented annually in October). Residents also 
decide on priority spending during formal public meetings which usually take place 
in April. From May to June there are additional public hearings, after which the 
budget is accepted. In 1993, the city received the Carl Bertelsmann Award for the 
“best‑managed city” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1993) and became a model for, among 
others, German cities. In contrast to the previously discussed example of Porto Ale‑
gre, here “participation” is set top‑down and is devoid of bottom‑up mobilisation 
and dynamics of neighbourhood meetings present in Brazil.
In Poland, participatory budgets are more similar to the Brazilian example, al‑
though residents are given about 1 percent of budget funds and they do not necessar‑
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ily allocate them for physical infrastructure. I have been interested in participatory 
budgeting in the country ever since its emergence in 2011 in Sopot (Łapniewska, 
2017) and I have monitored its growth until now, as it has become a popular form 
of participatory governance for more than 200 cities in the country2 (Dobiegała, 
2016). The group of advocates of engaging residents and local communities in pro‑
cesses related to the transformation of urban space and investments in social infra‑
structure consists of not only activists and employees of non‑governmental organi‑
sations, but also academics attributing PB’s sudden rise in popularity to the “crisis 








pectations as well as the selection and implementation of the projects that won. The 
researchers indicated that the initial expectations such as community gatherings, 
fixed budgetary allocations, the binding character of their decisions, the cyclical na‑
ture and tangible results had been met to some extent by most of the cities in which 
this form of budgeting was analysed (Kłębowski, 2014). However, a detailed analy‑
sis has not been conducted thus far, neither in Polish cities nor in any other city in the 
world, of processes taking place throughout the budget cycle (preparation, approv‑
al, implementation and evaluation of the budget), of participative budget manage‑
ment structures, the nature of the institutions (standards, rules, common strategies) 
at every stage of the cycle, characteristics of actors and their motivations, methods 
of interaction and transactions made. There has not been either any comparative 
research on an international scale carried out in this respect. To fill this gap and 
to get a fuller picture of the participatory budgeting phenomenon in different coun‑
tries, I am proposing a model, based on the assumptions of the new institutional 
economics, for analysing the phenomena of direct democracy based on the example 
of participatory budgeting processes (Scharpf, 1997; Ménard, Shirley, 2005). As PB 
phenomena attract more and more attention worldwide and citizens look for the 
best ways to implement PBs or to develop and expand their direct decision‑making 
power, this model may be a valuable and useful contribution to social sciences.
2 In 2018, civic budget regulations were introduced to the Acts pertaining to gmina (munici‑
pal), powiat (district) and voivodeship (province) local governments, to come into force in the 
2018–2022 term: “in municipalities that are cities with powiat rights [923 such cities in Po‑
land], the creation of a civic budget is obligatory, however, the amount of the civic budget 
is at least 0.5% of the municipality’s expenditure included in the last submitted budget report” 
(Journal of Laws of 2018, item 130).
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4. The FoIA Model
The main motivation to create an institutional analysis model for examining di‑
rect democracy phenomena was the need to include the complexity of process‑
es such as participatory budgeting in the research on governing the commons. 
Researchers often strive to simplify theoretical models and to universalise rec‑
ommendations. Meanwhile, in social sciences, where it is necessary to properly 
recognise and analyse the relationship between socio‑economic and political sys‑
tems and the specific resource around which these systems are built, to see and 
understand a coherent whole of the phenomenon studied, the subsequent layers 




variables, clusters of variables and holons can be transformed depending on the 
socio‑economic context or changes in time and location. These lists are also not 
fixed, but they present the components that may be useful in preparing fieldwork, 
in designing data collection instruments, or analysing research results on direct 
democracy processes. They are a reasonable entry point for further work on more 
comprehensive future models. This model also intends to inform all the parties 
involved in the processes of direct democracy about what factors must be taken 
into account to shape local policy in accordance with accepted values or assumed 
goals and lead to social change.
The following model was created as a result of deliberations on other models, 




1997: 44). However, I was interested in creating an analytical framework for pro‑
cesses taking place in urban space. That is why I used case studies such as hous‑
ing services in Kraków, a participatory budget in Sopot – both described earlier 
in my article published in the Review of Radical Political Economics (Łapniewska, 
2017) – and global examples of active participation of women in managing joint 
resources to build my own model, which was originally published in the journal 
Social Economy (in Polish) (Łapniewska, 2016). In this article, the model is trans‑
lated and individual holons and clusters of variables are accompanied with acro‑
nyms. An additional value of this article lies in the fact that the multitier conceptual 
map (Figure 1) has been supplemented with detailed variables for the case of par‑
ticipatory budgeting (Table 1) which constitute a common set of variables that can 
be potentially relevant to future comparative research on participatory budgeting 
in different countries (VoC perspective).
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The framework of institutional analysis presented in Figure 1 allows us to map 
direct democracy processes, including PB processes, presenting all significant in‑
teractions and links between them, and covers four holons: the institutional en‑
vironment of community/inhabitants (IE), actors involved (A), transactions (T) 
– in this case making decisions on the budget – in reference to the cultural, social,
political, physical, natural, financial and legislative capital of the community, and 
finally, outcomes (O). It is important to note the fact that the four categories are 
not separate spaces in which variables are placed, but interact with one another, 
which is illustrated by arrows in the diagram.
Figure 1. The Framework of Institutional Analysis (FoIA)
Source: adapted from Łapniewska, 2016: 66
Table 1. Examples of second‑level variables for analysing participatory budgeting under first‑level 
fields in the framework (FoIA)
Institutional environment (IE) Actors (A)
IE1 legal framework (IEI) A1 number of people involved (civil society)
IE2 political stability (IEI) A2 number of people involved (local 
government)
IE3 economic development (IEI) A3 history
IE4 institutional support (IEI) A4 socio‑economic characteristics of the 
community (intersectional approach)
IE5 local government work evaluation (IEI) A5 social capital of actors










A10 other involved entities (e.g. companies)
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Transactions (T) Outcomes (O)
T1 owning fixed assets (AA) O1 efficiency of budgeting processes
T2 financial capital (AA) O2 expenses are perceived as appropriate
T3 legal and economic systems (AA) O3 expenses contribute to raising the quality 
of life of residents
T4 methods of deliberation (MI) O4 position and agency of the inhabitants 
is raised
T5 decision making (MI) O5 greater equality achieved (in particular 
of the marginalised groups)
T6 level of cooperation (MI)





T11 social dimension of actions taken (DA)
T12 ecological dimension of actions taken 
(DA)
T13 political dimension of actions taken (DA)
T14 value of actions taken (DA)
T15 local/ regional/ national dimension (DA)
Source: Author’s own catalogue based on Ostrom, 2009: 421
In the very centre of the model, there are actors (A) who are the most impor‑
tant element and the entry point of the analysis. They have specific features, list‑
ed in Table 1, that enable and help them to take actions and make transactions or, 
to the contrary, make it difficult to reach agreements or achieve results. In addi‑
tion to the obvious variables such as the number of people participating in govern‑
ing the common good (A1, A2, A10) and their social capital (relations and mutual 
trust) (A5) listed in Table 1, the socio‑economic characteristics of the community 
(A4) are critical from the point of view of intersectionality. The intersectional per‑
spective focused on the relationship between the social position of actors and their 
changing characteristics of identity such as: sex expression, sexuality, age, ethnic 
and class origin, religion, (dis)ability, experience of migration or refuge, points out 
to the relationship of power and its translation into achieved results. An in‑depth 
analysis of the processes taking place in this approach can help us identify social 
factors affecting the efficiency and empowerment of various social groups, espe‑
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cially the disfavoured ones (e.g. refugees living in a camp in the Berlin‑Lichtenberg 
district in Germany, known for participatory budgeting, which in 2013 received 
Theodore‑Heuss Medal for “making politics together/shaping the city” – Scheel, 
2013), and the possibilities of their emancipation and increasing their influence 
on fiscal decisions (in the case of participatory budgeting), which may translate 
into an increase in their quality of life (when, for example, the aforementioned 
residents attach particular importance to the fact that education should be at least 
partially provided in Arabic, or that all the procedures related to administration 
and health care ought to be translated into this language).
To the left and right of the actors (A), there are institutional environment (IE) 
and transactions (T), respectively. Within each of them, there are three signifi‑








the environment functions in a sustainable way and our voice counts, communities 








nomics as a transfer of property rights or activities undertaken to transform a given 
good or service at the technological level (Beckmann, 2000). In the case of partici‑
patory budgeting discussed here, ownership rights remain unchanged, i.e. in public 
hands in the case of investment in physical infrastructure, and they belong to res‑
idents in the case of social investments (e.g. a dance course for senior citizens, 
a local picnic or tai‑chi in the park). Activities will focus on the budgeting pro‑
cess throughout the entire budgetary cycle (lasting a year, or – in Germany – two 
years, because budgets are prepared for this perspective and have to be evaluated). 
The actions take place in the action arena (AA), which has a local specificity and 
particular resources (T1), function within a particular economic system (T3) that 
depends on VoC, and residents have specific funds at their disposal (T2). The ac‑
tors involved (A) set the rules for cooperation (T4, T6, T7, T8), including the way 
of making decisions (T5). However, the effectiveness of their operation depends 
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on multitier actions on different levels (T15), in different dimensions (T11, T12, 
T13), as well as their abilities to network (T10) and lobby (T9).
The transactions lead to positive results, which among others include increased 
budgeting efficiency (O1) and residents’ satisfaction (O2, O3). However, in order 
for participatory budgets to contribute to social change, it is also necessary to ex‑
amine whether they have helped in achieving greater equality (O5), and, as a re‑
sult, whether the agency of residents has increased (O4), especially of those from 
marginalised groups (intersectional perspective).
In each of the above‑presented areas, variables are included that result from 
differences in the cultural context, and, thus depend on the country where partic‑
ipatory budgeting takes place, as well as from the variety of capitalism (i.e. so‑
cio‑economic conditions). These (VoC) variables include the level of cooperation 
(T6), the ability to work in a group (collective action) (A6), trust towards the na‑
tional/local government (IE8), local government work assessment (IE5), and effi‑
ciency of budgeting processes (O1). It would be interesting to conduct comparative 
research between the countries with different VoCs that would take these varia‑
bles into consideration in examining participatory budgeting processes. Naturally, 
the above‑presented model can be further transformed, becoming more detailed 
and constructive, as a result of deeper qualitative fieldwork. Because the proposed 
analysis is qualitative, hence its effectiveness cannot be quantitatively measured 
in a simple way, it remains a potential subject of a methodological discussion for 
interested researchers in the future. Several avenues seem worthwhile exploring, 
e.g. if institutions are associated with several actors at the same time, whether 
cross‑sections occur between them, what processes take place and whether the 
most visible ones do not obscure the most important ones. It is possible to attribute 
significance to the variables by introducing elements of quantitative assessment, 
e.g. by measuring the impact of the described three categories on the outcomes 
achieved. Due to the qualitative differences between variables, their detailed de‑
scription is necessary for making comparisons. The complexity of transactions, the 
fact that it is often impossible to isolate the processes, the difficulty in assigning 
them to specific variables and their final quantitative measurement might be treat‑
ed as a limitation of the presented model.
Finally, the reader may wonder why this model deals with sensu stricto anal‑
ysis of the phenomena of direct democracy while it seems to be more univer‑
sal. When I created it, I based it on models that focus on governing common‑pooled 
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5. Conclusions
The model of institutional analysis of direct democracy phenomena presented 
in this article provides a set of potentially relevant variables which can be employed 
in different research settings, thus not only economists, but also other social scien‑




parative study. Intersectionality deserves attention in research on all democratic 
innovations worldwide, thus this publication has a potential to scale up towards 
a comparative analysis of other socio‑economic processes and their engagement 
with policy. This model might also be relevant when analysing political, economic 
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Model analizy instytucjonalnej zjawisk demokracji bezpośredniej: przykład budżetowania 
partycypacyjnego
Streszczenie: Demokracja bezpośrednia, której tradycja sięga starożytnych Aten, jest obecnie szero‑
ko praktykowana w wielu krajach świata. W niniejszym artykule studium przypadku budżetu partycy‑
pacyjnego zostało przedstawione jako ilustracja tego, w jaki sposób mieszkańcy mogą bezpośrednio 
decydować o wspólnych zasobach. Artykuł ma charakter teoretyczny. Ma na celu przedstawienie mo‑
delu instytucjonalnej analizy zjawisk demokracji bezpośredniej na przykładzie analizy budżetów par‑
tycypacyjnych oraz zaprezentowanie zmiennych związanych z dwoma nowatorskimi podejściami: od‑
mianami kapitalizmu i intersekcjonalności. Model ten może być stosowany do diagnozowania wzorów 
demokracji lokalnej, do badań porównawczych procesów budżetowania partycypacyjnego w róż‑
nych krajach na całym świecie, a także do dalszych badań nad innymi procesami demokracji bezpo‑
średniej, przyczyniając się do rozwoju wiedzy w tej dziedzinie i w naukach społecznych ogółem.
Słowa kluczowe: demokracja bezpośrednia, budżetowanie partycypacyjne, nowa ekonomia insty‑
tucjonalna, odmiany kapitalizmu, podejście intersekcjonalne
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